Emulating the Greek geometers, Newton used synthetic demonstration to present the groundbreaking arguments of the Principia. This paper argues that we can better understand Newton's reasons for using geometry by considering John Wallis's interpretation of synthetic demonstration. Wallis condemned demonstration for failing to explain the mathematical truths it presented. He opposed to it a presentation that combined symbolic analysis with a documented account of discovery. In preferring symbols, Wallis was motivated both by the nascent tradition of symbolic analysis and by contemporary interest in artificial languages. Newton maintained Wallis's characterization of Greek demonstration as adapted to common understanding rather than as strictly elucidating, but he inverted the values Wallis associated with synthesis and analysis. In Newton's new account, synthetic demonstration was preferable precisely because it could address inexpert readers without exposing them to the complications of symbols-based analysis. Newton advanced his arguments on behalf of geometry through portraits of ancient mathematicians: Archimedes and Pythagoras.
With a handful of exceptions, Isaac Newton used geometric deductions rather than symbolic manipulations to make the mathematical arguments of the Mathematical principles of natural philosophy (hereafter Principia). These two kinds of mathematical argument are not necessarily opposed, as demonstrated by those exceptions where Newton deftly mixed them. Early modern mathematicians had options when deciding how to present their arguments. In several manuscripts from the 1680s and 1690s, Newton depicted geometrical presentation as an alternative to algebra. 1 In some of these manuscripts, arguments from the preface and propositions from the Principia find their place in longer discussions of geometric style and critiques of modern symbolic analysis.
2 For Newton's early modern predecessors, algebra or symbolic analysis was a heuristic tool for finding solutions in geometry. Inspired by his 1670s readings of the Greek geometers, Newton sought a purely geometrical analysis, one that could perform comparable heuristic functions without using symbols.
Readers familiar with a longstanding historiographical debate about whether book II of Euclid's Elements should be interpreted algebraically could justly wonder whether focus on Newton's 'geometric' style is merely an artefact of more recent preconceptions. 3 Interpretations of Euclid's text that were influential in the twentieth century employed the distinction between mathematical content and its appearance in writing. Newton and other seventeenth-century mathematicians themselves made a version of this distinction when they assessed whether the synthetic demonstrations of the ancient geometers should be imitated or whether a different mode of writing should be pioneered. In his 1657 Mathesis universalis, for instance, John Wallis printed geometric representations of the first 10 propositions of book II of the Elements alongside symbolic 'arithmetical' demonstrations and worked examples in numbers; he believed that the symbolic treatment was more general. 4 Newton's own exploration of the distinction between algebra and geometry as styles of writing lasted more than a decade. Through his readings of ancient and modern writers, Newton encountered different forms of mathematical presentation as different kinds of argument. He employed diverse resources to explain their difference: Newton's study of ancient geometry occasioned far-reaching discussions of epistemology, sociology and aesthetics, discussions that scholars of Newton's writings have brought to bear in reconstructing Newton's polymathic learning and the natural philosophical reflections it made possible. Newton's reflections on his mathematical experience led him to develop a form of geometrical analysis that would make arguments quite different from those generated by symbolic analysis.
Historians of mathematics recognize that Wallis's 1656 Arithmetic of infinities was a crucial text for Newton's development of calculus, a fact that Newton himself related to Gottfried Leibniz in a famous letter. 5 I argue here that distinctions between algebra and geometry made by Wallis, both in his mathematical practice and in his programmatic discussions, are a helpful context for understanding Newton's developed preference for geometry. Normative appeals to ancient geometry were widespread in seventeenth-century mathematics. These appeals were frequently negative: geometric demonstration was presented as a bad example. Wallis developed this appeal in a particularly clear way, denigrating synthetic demonstration for its failure to bring clarity to mathematical investigation. In this article, I show how Newton reversed the value of the normative appeal, lauding demonstration for bringing a kind of clarity distinct from that offered by symbolic manipulation. In particular, I argue that the preference for geometry that Newton developed in the 1680s depended on a conception of the intended readers of the Greek geometrical texts that Wallis had elaborated.
Certain readers may find it helpful for me to frame my argument more narrowly in terms of the extant scholarly literature. In his major study of Newton's mathematics, Niccolò Guicciardini argued that Newton came to prefer geometric demonstration for the greater certainty it offered over symbolic manipulation. According to Guicciardini, mathematics served Newton particularly by bringing certainty to natural philosophy. In his far-reaching investigations of Newton's manuscripts, Guicciardini masterfully analysed a wide range of aesthetic, sociological and epistemological factors that motivated Newton's preference for geometry, not just as a matter of synthetic demonstration, but also in the practice of analysis. across several manuscripts from the 1690s. Namely, Newton believed that mathematical demonstrations emergent from geometrical analysis could be more easily understood by a wider audience, especially one composed of unskilled readers. Such arguments were more suitable for 'public utterance' since they were more persuasive to a less competent audience. The association between geometric synthesis and 'common' understanding was not Newton's innovation: many of Newton's predecessors, including Wallis, endorsed it. Rob Iliffe and other historians have discussed Newton's cultivation of a hierarchical epistemology in theological matters, one anchored in the hermeneutical theory of divine accommodation which was widely diffused in early modern England. 7 I cannot here give a diachronic account of Newton's mathematical writings from the 1660s onwards, which would explain why Newton came to adopt as his own audience in mathematical writing those readers who shared a merely common understanding. My more modest goal is just to show how Newton's study of ancient geometry reflected this ambition.
Reflecting the hierarchical epistemology Newton espoused elsewhere, Guicciardini has distinguished Newton's use of 'scribal publication' for sharing his symbols-based algorithms with 'a closed circle of acolytes' from his willingness to print works written using geometric demonstrations. In explaining why Newton sought to develop a fully geometrical analysis, however, Guicciardini appealed more generally to the greater 'certainty' geometry offered over symbols. This explanation is somewhat far from the actual content of Newton's critiques of symbolic mathematics, critiques that Guicciardini discusses with great nuance and sensitivity. 8 In this article I reframe geometry's appeal in terms of its power to persuade, a power condemned by Wallis and lauded by Newton. The certainty Newton saw in geometry pertained especially to its persuasiveness, not to its greater reliability as compared with symbolic techniques. 9 My focus on persuasion, if somewhat different from interpretations of synthetic demonstration advanced today by historians of early modern philosophy, is entirely consistent with assessments of synthetic geometry by the seventeenth century's leading mathematical practitioners. Recovering this focus can help explain just why Newton saw ancient porisms as a model for a geometrical analysis that would be more suitable for the common understanding.
ALGEBRA VERSUS GEOMETRY
A manuscript from around 1680 manifests the intersection of classical philology, polemic against his contemporaries and technical mathematics characteristic of Newton's mathematical writings. 'Men of recent times, eager to add to the discoveries of the ancients, have united the arithmetic of variables with geometry', Newton observed. By 'arithmetic of variables' Newton meant algebra: Newton's term 'speciosam' referred to the symbols that algebraists used instead of numbers when they performed their calculations. Newton recognized that algebra was a good choice for mathematicians who sought novelties, since it had led to 'profuseness of output'. 10 Seventeenth-century proponents of symbols frequently advanced the fecundity of their approach as evidence for its superiority over classical mathematics: Wallis's Arithmetic of infinities displayed results 'neither discovered by nor known to others', and René Descartes's 1637 Geometry announced its general solution to a family of problems that the Greeks had left mostly unsolved. 11 In the 1660s Newton, inspired above all by these two texts, had used symbols to invent an algorithmic version of the calculus.
Around 1680, Newton recognized the fecundity of analysis, but advanced directness of expression as a competing mathematical goal. 'If you look at the complexity of its conclusions,' he claimed, algebra is less appealing. 'For these computations, progressing by means of arithmetical operations alone, very often express in an intolerably roundabout way quantities which in geometry are designated by the drawing of a single line'. 13 In a contemporary manuscript he targeted Descartes directly, contrasting symbols with language rather than computation with construction. When symbolic arguments were 'resolved [resolutus] into words (following the practice of the Ancients in their writings)', Newton claimed, they became 'tedious', 'entangled', and difficult to understand.
14 The classical form of the demonstration-combining diagrams and language-was clearer than Descartes's approach whether or not the referents of his symbols were spelled out.
Newton's critique of Descartes's analysis warns us against identifying the aesthetic distinction between algebra and geometry with the distinction, widespread in early modern methodological discussions, between analysis and synthesis. 15 Saying just what this latter distinction meant to early modern writers can be a vexed undertaking. 16 The vagueness of the terms' classical formulation sometimes allowed them to suggest methodological regularity across a range of disciplines; at other times, however, early modern writers sought to define them precisely. 17 The Collections of the late antique mathematician Pappus (fourth century AD) were critical in philological reconstructions of the terms' ancient meanings. In Pappus's usage, the terms established an inverse relationship between two ways of presenting roughly the same conclusions: analysis displayed how they were discovered while synthesis proved them in light of principles. In their eagerness to methodize discovery, early modern thinkers often saw analysis as an actual means of discovery, rather than as an epistemic genre exhibiting a discovery narrative. 18 François Viète's identification of algebra as a form of analysis in his 1591 Introduction to the analytic art was pivotal in popularizing this heuristic notion of analysis among mathematicians. Basing himself on classical sources, Viète claimed that the ancients' analysis, like algebra, involved treating the sought quantity as given, and working backwards from the assumed solution to something actually known. 19 Solutions provided by analysis could then be 'reversed' into a synthesis, and geometrical constructions drawn out of algebraic manipulations. Yet the same problem, Viète observed, could be constructed in different ways with varying 'elegance'. 20 Newton agreed. To his eye, algebra furnished solutions that remained puzzling even once they were reversed and 'transposed into words'. Newton condemned algebra for producing inelegant synthetic constructions, and he coordinated this inelegance with the desire for fecundity that led his contemporaries to embrace analysis. Algebra was supposed to produce typical geometric presentations. In practice, it did not. Algebra appealed to Newton's contemporaries not only for its fecundity but also for the very presentational qualities that Newton condemned. Wallis's discussion of the practice is typical in its attitude if exemplary in being accompanied by an illustrative example. In the dedication to his 1655 Treatise on conic sections, Wallis contrasted his novel treatment of the conic sections with the diagrammatic treatment in Apollonius's Conics (third century BC), the most extensive ancient treatment he knew. 21 The Greek text was 'neglected beyond measure' by Wallis's contemporaries 'as though it were insurmountable and full of troublesome madness'. Wallis implied that geometers read it only superficially since they feared that it would drive them mad. 22 He contrasted his own figures with Apollonius's overdrawn diagrams: he claimed to use 'schemata as simple as possible, lest 25 By means of stable diagrams, Wallis explained, he could introduce cognitively useful lettering practices and symbolic expressions. The repeated diagrams 'served this purpose, that we designate the same points (through almost the whole treatise) with the same many letters, so that the schemata might be unchanging. And we designate the same quantities with the same symbols everywhere'. 26 Wallis always called the intercepted diameter AD and always called the applied ordinate DO (see figure 1): he always designated the former as d and designated the latter as p, e or h depending on whether he was describing a parabola, ellipse or hyperbola. Combined with his effort to standardize the mathematical arguments about each curve, these decisions visibly homogenized Wallis's algebraic Wallis and Newton on mathematical presentation 451 representations of the conic sections
where l is the latus rectum LA and t is Aa, the major axis of an ellipse or the transverse diameter of a hyperbola. 27 Deducing such equations was the concern of the first part of the text; in the second part, he exploited them. Easy manipulation could provide the magnitude of any of these lengths given the others: adapting geometric terminology, Wallis called such manipulations 'corollaries'. Clearly intended as a textbook, On conic sections gave analytic 'examinations' and synthetic 'demonstrations' of the major propositions in order to show the inverse relationship between the procedure of the former and the argumentation of the latter. Wallis listed the geometric constructions that could be 'collected' from his symbolic treatment. 28 By regularizing the use of symbols Wallis circumvented the typical role of diagrams in geometric argument. In the works of the Greek geometers the text referred directly to the diagram and was sometimes incomprehensible without it. 29 Wallis's new lettering strategy meant that the reader would not have to constantly look back at the diagram to understand the argument. Rather, the reader might recognize from the letters which parts of the cone were signified by which letters: 'these have not been chosen by chance, but with much discrimination, so that the same look either of letters or symbols might refer for some distance to the thing designated.' 30 Fixity of reference freed the reader from looking back at the designated thing. Wallis leveraged the sameness of the letters' 'look' to make the letters signify without using the diagram. His desire to use this kind of argument-in the next section we will see why he conceived this desire-did not lead him to reject the diagram, but rather to rethink it so that it could admit algebraic argument more effectively. Wallis's synthesis sometimes arose from a reversed analysis; when it did not, Wallis treated the diagram like an arrangement of magnitudes awaiting their calculator. 31 In their actual mathematical writings-in Wallis' printed works and in Newton's manuscripts-Wallis continued to use diagrams and Newton symbols. Nevertheless, in their programmatic discussions, both contrasted ancient and modern forms of mathematical writing and connected this contrast to an opposition between geometry and algebra as styles of reasoning. Newton opposed entangled and tedious algebraic calculations to simple, elegant geometric constructions; Wallis opposed difficult, embrangled geometric diagrams to simplified, rationally lettered diagrams and the symbolic expressions they enabled. How did they decide what counted as simple-and for whom?
WALLIS'S DISTINCTION: REAL CHARACTERS AGAINST GREEK SOPHISTRY
In using symbols to ameliorate discourse, Wallis was not alone among mid-century English scholars. The artificial language planners of the 'experimental philosophical club' of 1650s Oxford sought various kinds of systems of symbols that could both ameliorate communication between different nations and aid discovery. Seth Ward-the dedicatee of On Abram Kaplan conic sections and Wallis's colleague at Oxford-projected a character that would refer directly to notions and, through them, to more complex thoughts. Such 'real characters', Ward and others hoped, would circumvent the confusions of language and expedite natural philosophy. 32 As Ward wrote in a polemical defence of the interregnum university:
By the helpe of Logick and Mathematicks [the character] might soone receive a mighty advantage, for all Discourses being resolved in sentences, those into words, words signifying either simple notions or being resolvible into simple notions, it is manifest, that if all the sorts of simple notions be found out, and have Symboles assigned to them, those will be extremely few. 33 In analogy to algebraic manipulations, Ward also saw a manipulative use for such symbols. Since 'the reason of their composition [will be] easily known', Ward anticipated, 'the most compounded ones at once will be comprehended, and yet will represent to the very eye all the elements of their composition, & so deliver the natures of things: and exact discourses may be made demonstratively without any other paines then is used in the operations of specious Analytics'. 34 The demonstrative capacity of algebra was a model for the philosophical use of symbols.
Ward knew whereof he spoke: in On conic sections, Wallis had indeed claimed that algebra would enable an 'absolute contemplation' of the conic sections by directly expressing what he called the 'primary and essential affections' from which secondary affections could be 'deduced by calculation'. The essential affections 'explained their absolute nature, so that generated either by the cut cone or otherwise, the same absolute nature had to be designated with the same characters' or equations. 35 Both the use of symbols to express essences and their manipulation to obtain easy results characterized Wallis's mathematical practice.
Ward stressed the utility of symbols' strong visual character for exposing arguments: 'We are enabled to behold, as it were, with our eyes', he wrote, 'that long continued series of mixt and intricate Ratiocination, which would confound the strongest fancy to sustaine it'. 36 Ward was echoing the preface to the English edition of William Oughtred's Clavis mathematicae, a work that was also important for Wallis's mathematical education. 37 In his preface, Oughtred claimed that symbols 'racketh [not] the memory with multiplicity of words, nor chargeth the phantasie with comparing and laying things together; but plainly presenteth to the eye the whole course and processe of every operation and argumentation'. 38 Oughtred offered a powerful interpretation of Viète's new algebra: not just a practice of manipulation that used symbols to find solutions to problems, algebra was a practice of writing that left on the page written traces that could be inspected by the mathematician as well as by later readers. Its execution left in its wake an argument, the 'footprints' that Wallis and others claimed they could reverse into a synthesis.
Unlike his contemporary, Descartes, Oughtred did not contrast visual and mental beholding; in the context of symbols, at least, he aligned them. 39 'Wherefore that I might more cleerly behold the things themselves', he wrote, 'I uncasing the Propositions and Demonstrations out of their covert of words, designed them in notes and species appearing to the very eye'. 40 On the opposition of symbols to language both the supporters of symbols and their opponents, like Thomas Hobbes, agreed. 41 If for Hobbes symbols promoted calculation without understanding, for their proponents symbols acted on the eyes without tiring the fancy: they benefitted from the evidence of the visual without suffering its shortcomings. Since they exposed the whole argument to inspection, no wonder that Wallis saw symbols as 'helps of both fantasy and memory'. 42 Wallis's expression 'essential characters', referring to Wallis and Newton on mathematical presentation the equations that expressed 'essential affections' of conic sections, telegraphed Oughtred's claim that symbols clearly expressed things. 43 Its relative independence from fancy (that is, imagination) distinguished Wallis's approach to conics from that of Apollonius: the Greek geometer must have been 'a man of a prodigious reach of Phansy, if we can think it possible that he could discover all those Propositions, and perplex demonstrations, in the same order they are there delivered, without some such Art of Invention'. 44 Wallis did not think it possible. Judging from their own experience, early modern mathematicians could hardly believe that the ancients made their discoveries without an 'art of invention': yet another term that Viète, and Wallis after him, identified with analysis. While the term expressed analysis' use as an actual tool for discovery, the duality of analysis as both means of finding and mode of presentation anchored Wallis's suspicions. Precisely because things found by analysis could be presented otherwise (owing to the opposition between analysis and synthesis as modes of presentation), things presented otherwise (synthetically) could still have been found with analysis (understood as art of finding rather than epistemic genre). This bit of logical reasoning established only possibility, yet it was used to impute presence, and it undergirded important readings of Apollonius, Archimedes and other mathematicians in the period between Viète's writings and Newton's. Apollonius had shown some analysis a few times: for Wallis and other readers, this meant that he used it everywhere. 45 In Arithmetic of infinities Wallis contrasted more sharply the didactic utility of symbols with the opacity of diagram-based demonstration. Arithmetic of infinities used symbolic manipulation not primarily to represent curve-types with equations (as On conic sections did) but rather to generate the 'proper characters' of infinitely long series. 46 Throughout the text Wallis used numbers and symbols to exhibit the constant relationships between various series, especially series of figurate numbers and their sides. In a late proposition he claimed that 'from the known characters of a few series . . . a method for investigating the characters of the following [series] will shine forth'. 47 Based on a pattern he observed in the characters of the first few figurate numbers, Wallis conceived a procedure for generating further characters. 48 Left unexploited by earlier mathematicians or used only as 'sport', Wallis explained how to use figurate numbers to measure areas and volumes and, eventually, to square the circle. 49 The particulars of his epistemology of induction aside, Wallis clearly decided to foreground his investigative progress in his writing. 50 As a matter of presentation, he de-emphasized traditional forms of mathematical demonstration, instead taking literally the traditional definition of analysis as a way of finding. He believed he could promote mathematics more by exposing his own investigations than through sterile demonstrations.
In a stretch of propositions, Wallis exploited both the series-based mathematics of Arithmetic of infinities and the 'absolute' treatment of conic sections from On conic sections to find areas of figures with infinitely long sides. 51 Such infinite figures could be classified depending on whether, and how, they were measurable. 52 In a final proposition on this theme, Wallis observed that he could also find the ratio between the solids generated by rotating such figures and circumscribing cylinders. The similarity of this result to classical discoveries about the sphere and the cylinder gave Wallis the occasion to distinguish his approach. 'Perhaps it would have been more prudent, if I were only writing to seek fame', he observed, 'to have presented some few particular propositionsas something admirable or stupefying-with apagogic proofs, concealing the method by which they were reached'. The ancients' proofs by contradiction did just this, Wallis
Abram Kaplan explained, 'in order that others would marvel at them rather than understand; at least, so that these others, being compelled, produce their assent to those utterances of the mathematicians rather than understand a genuine investigation of the problem'. 53 Wallis claimed that Greek geometry's reliance on fancy rendered it stupefying and its readers bilious. This diagnosis instanced a broader critique of non-methodical philosophy. In a 1651 critique of the philosopher Thomas Vaughan, the natural philosopher Henry More condemned the 'melancholick, flatuous and heedlesse phansie' of Vaughan's writings 'clothed with sonorous and amazing terms, such as might rather astonish the ignorant, then teach the docible'. 54 Mid-century philosophers would medicalize the critique of enthusiasm, in part by offering a physiological account of the imagination. 55 In an important source for seventeenth-century critiques of the imagination, Francis Bacon's New organon condemned Greek philosophy in general as sophistical. 56 While the works of Aristotle 'were more satisfying and pleasing to the capacity and attitudes of the vulgar' than the difficult writings of Democritus and Heraclitus, even the earlier philosophers 'were too much given to the ambition and vanity of setting up a sect and courting public favour'. 57 Wallis seems to have assimilated Greek mathematicians to the philosophers we call pre-Socratic: impressive, even brilliant, they nevertheless wrote for fame rather than for the advancement of learning. In his influential Introduction, Viète had already characterized synthetic demonstration as a ploy for reputation. 58 Perhaps moved by Bacon, Wallis gave a thicker portrait of geometrical demonstration to which he contrasted his own form of mathematical presentation.
By clearly displaying both his empirical inspection of arithmetic patterns and his discovery of proper characters therein, Wallis used Arithmetic of infinities to produce genuine understanding rather than brutal persuasion. The display may have been less miraculous than classical demonstration, but it was for that less stupefying and more edifying: 'I preferred, however, by philosophizing freely, to open the very sources, so that by this work the reader might be able to begin to feel deeply both the demonstrations of the propositions and the method by which I arrived there'. 59 Experiencing another mathematician's thinking is the beginning of the learning process.
NEWTON'S OPPOSITION: PRUDENT GEOMETERS AGAINST PERPLEXING ALGEBRA
Newton demurred, not from Wallis's depiction of geometry's obscurity, but from his judgement about intellectual transparency as a desideratum. In a manuscript related to the one I quoted earlier, Newton contrasted the analytic study of curves, which he associated most insistently with Descartes's use of symbols, with the proof-based style he could read in the writings of ancient geometers. Descartes had claimed to offer a more general solution to 'locus' problems, a family of problems identified by Apollonius and Pappus. 60 From the absence of any apparent general solution in Apollonius's Conics or Pappus's Collections, Descartes inferred that the ancients had no such solution. Newton rejected Descartes's reading of Pappus. 'Pappus informs us of a method for drawing an ellipse through five given points and the reasoning is the same in the case of the other conics', Newton wrote. 'If the ancients knew how to draw a conic through five given points', he asked, 'does any one not see that they found out the composition of the solid locus?' 61 Expecting ancient mathematicians to write like moderns led to arrogant, ignorant readings of ancient texts. Wallis rebuked the ancients for producing miraculous results in order to Wallis and Newton on mathematical presentation become famous; Newton rebuked the moderns for showing off their generality (a display they made with a similar motive).
In a family of manuscripts written some 10 years later, Newton sketched out the opening disquisition of a possible book about geometry. 62 Newton's goal here was no longer simply to elaborate the opposition between geometry and algebra or to demonstrate that the ancients had already accomplished Descartes's prize construction. Rather, Newton was concerned to explore more systematically just what the ancients' 'geometrical analysis' looked like. Adapting Viète's definition of analysis, Newton supposed that the ancients had a form of analysis that could, without the use of symbols, perform the heuristic functions of algebra in seeking out both constructions and demonstrations. In the wake of the success of the Principia, Newton undertook to recover this analysis by reconstructing Euclid's lost Porisms on the basis of some remarks in Pappus's Collections. 63 The procedure described by Pappus, Newton wrote in one manuscript from the period, 'is the very thing we do when, by assuming the unknown as known and therefrom by an appropriate argument collecting something known as unknown, we reduce a problem to an equation'. The ancients, he elaborated, 'whose aim was composition, frequently arrived at simpler conclusions than the moderns, who are more devoted to algebra'. Distinguishing between 'solution' and 'resolution', Newton explained that the ancients' analysis left problems not 'resolved' [resolutum] through analysis, but rather 'solved' [solutum], 'without analysis . . . both enunciated and proved'. 64 In the 1680s Newton's investigations of Greek analysis fuelled his critique of Descartes and his development of novel geometric techniques. In the 1690s these normative investigations ripened into a project in mathematical philology: the recovery of the porisms. 65 Newton reinterpreted Descartes's distinction between geometrical and mechanical curves as he set out to determine which geometric constructions were appropriate for the study of geometry. Appropriating Pappus's injunction not to construct 'plane' problems with 'solid' conic curves, Descartes had introduced a hierarchy of problems regulating the kinds of permissible constructions. 66 As Mary Domski has recognized, Descartes's criteria for construction are Newton's polemical target. Descartes judged as inadmissible in geometry certain curves that could not be known 'exactly'. Descartes called these curves, constructible only with tools, 'mechanical'. Mechanical curves, Newton retorted, were just as exact as the mechanic was perfect. Domski has rightly seen Newton's rebuke of Descartes as evidence of Newton's openness to a far wider range of curves. 67 Newton is concerned in this manuscript to establish the postulates-and therewith, the constructions-fit for geometry. Despite Newton's openness to Descartes's so-called mechanical curves, however, these postulates turn out to be more limited than Domski's analysis suggests. Let us see why.
Newton rejected one constructive postulate in particular: 'The postulate of moving any lines whatever according to appointed laws and by their intersections describing new lines. . .is exceedingly complex and akin to an infinity of postulates when, however, it ought to be very simple'. 68 A version of this 'postulate', although not so-called, was one premise of Descartes's complex constructions in the Geometry: by moving conics in the plane at regulated speeds, Descartes could construct higher-order curves. Descartes also offered geometric constructions of the basic arithmetic operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication and division. 69 The infinite postulate, Newton complained, was 'too hard for the novice; for it requires him before he starts to be a geometer to frame any arbitrary lines and move them in any manner whatever, both geometrical and in ways later to be ascertained'. 70 It also gave rise to the convoluted constructions that Newton lamented in the Abram Kaplan earlier manuscript: if one were to actually construct one of Descartes's symbolic expressions using his constructions of the operations, the diagram would become convoluted indeed.
Newton believed that geometric writers should limit themselves to the more limited Euclidean postulates of drawing a straight line and a circle, since in their simplicity, they were more easily understood. The aesthetic critique of algebraic constructions as convoluted that Newton developed around 1680 now found its place in a context at once sociological and epistemological. In composing their purely geometric proofs, Newton explained in one manuscript, the ancients 'used to shape demonstrations of their findings in a form adapted to the common capacity to comprehend'. Modern algebraists, by contrast, 'exhibit the analysis of the finding and are less solicitous about its composition'. Wallis had judged that symbols could serve both to exhibit the analysis and to present demonstrations in a more widely comprehensible form. Newton disagreed, insisting that the common capacity required geometry. Newton endorsed in his mathematics a hierarchical epistemology similar to the remnant theology that Stephen Snobelen has found in Newton's theological writings. 71 As in those writings, Newton judged that arguments (here, mathematical ones) should be presented differently to different capacities. 'The common person does not understand' analysis, he continued. 72 In another manuscript, Newton staked out his position through a portrait of an ancient practitioner: Archimedes, the very mathematician whose apagogic proofs for measurements of areas and volumes inspired Wallis's reflection on geometric synthesis. 73 Archimedes 'often treats solid problems, but never in fact solves them by conics', Newton observed. He continued: 'their constructions he either passes over or exhibits by inclinations of straight lines,' using what Whiteside identified as the neusis construction, 'in the ancients' manner'. 74 Newton generalized Archimedes' behaviour into a principle. For solid problems involving higher-order curves, the geometer could indeed exploit 'any manual operation which shall seem simplest'. But the geometer 'does not order that operation in composition-he merely hints at it as a possibility, or proposes it hypothetically and as a species of theorem, or deduces it from the assumption of what is required, or finally assumes it as granted in the circumstances of the problem'. 75 There were a number of ways to include complex mechanical operations in geometry, but actually doing them was not one of them. Geometry does not eschew difficult constructions, Newton explained: it merely dissembles or, as in the case of the neusis, assumes them. Geometry freely commands simpler operations known to everyone, but it 'thinks it absurd, however, to postulate that novices should control the more difficult operations, and accordingly does not dictate those for all'. Instead, geometry 'merely notices [speculatur]' such operations 'and obliquely propounds them for the use of those who are more proficient and have acquired in themselves a mastery over them'. 76 The same was perhaps true of symbolic analysis. Commentators have long been troubled by Newton's claim that the synthetic demonstrations of the Principia were actually derived using the fluxional analysis (or symbolic calculus) that Newton accused Gottfried Leibniz of plagiarizing from him. Since Newton's claims about the fluxional origins of the Principia postdate the emergence of the priority dispute over the calculus, their significance is probably polemical. 77 Nevertheless, Guicciardini has identified some cases where Newton surely did use symbolic analysis both finite and infinitesimal in deriving the Principia's theorems. Guicciardini observes that Newton's decision to 'hide' his use of symbols derived from the unsuitability of algebra for a wide audience. But he also notes that in Wallis and Newton on mathematical presentation many places Newton simply concealed his use of fluxional analysis 'without replacing it with a geometrical demonstration that can stand on its own'.
To my mind this lacuna is not really the 'failure' that Guicciardini sees it as. 78 While Wallis saw subtle geometry as a means for astonishing and stupefying the reader, for Newton it was a gentle way of preventing confusion and circumventing demands that were too difficult. By concealing the analysis, Newton rendered the text apparently demonstrative. Only those readers who were expert in mathematics-those who could actually understand Newton's proofs-could recognize the lacunae, and these were precisely the readers for whom analysis was suitable. As Newton would later observe about Archimedes, Newton's geometry 'obliquely propounds' such techniques in ways that are visible to the skilled. Newton's style of writing preserves epistemological hierarchy: instead of expanding the capacity of the 'unskilled men and mechanics' whom geometers were supposed to teach, Newton instructed geometers to cater to it. In a related discussion of Pappus and Archimedes, he explained that 'no answer may be made' to questioners 'before the reply is adapted to their capacity for understanding'. 78 Precisely such a response was 'solution' as opposed to 'resolution'. 79 The kind of analysis Newton countenanced would be composed of 'porisms', propositions 'whereby out of the circumstances of a problem we gather some given thing of use to its resolution'. 80 In the manuscript where he told experts not to ask questions, Newton expanded Pappus's terse summary of some of Euclid's porisms by expressing each in terms of a lettered diagram. 'If from the two given points A, B straight lines AZ, BZ be inclined to the straight line CZ given in position', Newton proposed, 'let one, AZ, cut off from the straight line EX given in position a segment EX, terminated at the given point E in it, having a given proportion to the other, CZ, given in position' (see figure 2) . Note that EX and CZ are parallel and E, C, A and B are collinear. Newton concluded: 'Then the other, BZ, will cut off the segment EY having a given proportion to the same CZ'. 81 Like all of Newton's porisms in this discussion, here the language of the givens enforces the predicament of knowledge, rendering explicit what further knowledge one's present knowledge entails. 82 Wallis's treatment of the conic sections was not entirely dissimilar from Newton's porisms. Wallis's corollaries, like porisms, had served the function of generating further givens: with any Abram Kaplan 458 two of the intercepted diameter, applied ordinate, and latus rectum 'being given,' he explained in the case of the parabola, 'the remaining are also given in magnitude.' 83 Wallis had claimed that geometric constructions could be 'collected' from algebraic manipulations. However, in Newton's eyes, the symbolic manipulations employed heuristically by Wallis and Descartes were characterized by an open-endedness inappropriate to mathematical writing. With their insistence on the givens, the porisms constituted an analysis that disguised the predicament of ignorance characteristic of investigation.
In the manuscript discussion of Archimedes, Newton underscored that 'figures given in the circumstances of a question are in a geometer's power'. Geometry is open to complex curves only insofar as these are posited as given in the question; these are the curves that are, somehow, known to the questioner. Where Descartes delimited geometry with a construction-based criterion, Newton delimited geometrical constructions with a givenness-based criterion: 'Geometrical constructions . . . are ones which are achieved by means of straight lines and circles and any figures whatever given in the plane.' 84 In a much-discussed passage from a 1710s manuscript preface for a revised edition of the Principia, Newton claimed that 'the force of geometry and its whole fame [laus omnis] lay in the utter certainty of its matters, and that certainty in its splendidly composed demonstrations'. 85 In this late passage, Newton was mostly concerned to demonstrate his priority in the invention of calculus by explaining away his use of geometric demonstration in the Principia. 86 Even here, however, his language underscored the power of geometry to project brilliantly the appearance of certitude-an appearance that served its persuasive force and its public status.
For Wallis, the pernicious persuasiveness of synthesis meant it should be avoided. Newton disagreed. Explicit display of the investigative procedure was unproductive: analysis 'is ill-suited to be taught to the masses. It is neither easy to understand nor plain in its demonstration nor natural in its sequence of content'. 87 Perhaps worse, such displays as Wallis made undermined the authority of the teacher: 'One who propounds a question confesses that he is ignorant of its solution: this does not befit those practised in the analytic art'. 88 At stake in geometrical synthesis was psychology, not logical foundation. The givens-based geometrical analysis that Newton sought in the 1690s could serve as a means for both conducting and communicating investigation that more effectively preserved extant cognitive hierarchies.
COGNITIVE HIERARCHY AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHY
As many scholars have observed, the mechanical and natural philosophical aims of the Principia saw Newton advance ontological arguments in favour of geometry in that text and related manuscripts. These arguments commingled with the epistemological justification for geometry that I have been exploring. In a series of lemmas that Newton advanced to ground the mathematics of the Principia, Newton showed how finite diagrams could be used to measure nascent and evanescent quantities. 89 In addition to providing a classically rigorous justification for his use of such infinitesimally small quantities, these lemmas-according to some scholars-grounded Newton's mathematics in an ontology of mathematical objects based on the generation of magnitudes through motion. Newton had encountered this ontology in the lectures of his predecessor, Isaac Barrow. 90 Katherine Dunlop stresses that, in some of the 1690s manuscripts, Newton
Wallis and Newton on mathematical presentation 459 characterized geometry as fundamentally concerned with the measurement of magnitudes. 91 Seen alongside Newton's contemporaneous renovation of the porisms, Newton's remarks about measurement suggest that analysis serves the purpose of measurement by augmenting those things that the geometer can count as 'given' or known. Newton's lemmas, like most of the porisms he advanced, involved the relationship between situational and metric knowledge, between things 'given in position' and those 'given in proportion' or 'given in magnitude'. 92 The lemmas were not simply geometric arguments that justified his references to nascent ratios. They were exemplary instances of the use of positional givens to furnish metrical givens. Rather than invite his readers to measure infinitely small quantities directly through the 'method of indivisibles' advanced by Wallis, Newton advanced instead a classically-inspired means for knowing what could be known, a means that silently ignored indeterminable quantities. Newton warned his readers against erroneously inferring that 'if the ultimate ratios of vanishing magnitudes are given, their ultimate magnitudes will also be given'. Such an inference would lead to the contradiction and subsequent confusion that Newton's gentle geometric method served to avoid. 93 Scholars have rightly looked to Newton's other intellectual endeavours in order to explain his preference for geometric presentation, since Newton made similar choices in presenting his theology and natural philosophy. 94 In 1680 Newton wrote to the natural philosopher Thomas Burnet to discuss the hermeneutical theory of accommodation: the claim that the Bible was written in the language of the vulgar.
95 While Newton disagreed with Burnet's depiction of Moses as a sly pedagogue who used fictions to promote faith, he accepted that Genesis offered a phenomenal, not philosophical, account of the creation of the world. When making his famous distinction between absolute and relative qualities in the Principia, Newton may have intended 'relative' to refer to the common capacities of a mind unable to abstract away from the senses. 96 In manuscripts about the origins of religion, Newton claimed that the philosophizing priests who maintained ancient religion metaphorically instantiated their true beliefs in popular worship practices: the worship of fires in round temples, for example, instantiated a primitive heliocentrism. 97 Newton sought a geometry that would curate mathematical experience by accommodating varying levels of understanding, just like the theology and natural philosophy he espoused.
In dissembling his recondite knowledge of nature, Newton emulated the ancient priests from whom, he believed, the Greek philosophers had received elements of the prisca sapientia.
98 But in using mathematics as a means of investigation, Newton differed from them considerably. For the priests, mathematics was a means of indicating profound truths while concealing them from the many. 99 Newton was more like Pythagoras: as Newton depicted him, the Greek philosopher discovered the secrets of nature using contemporary means of investigation. Pythagoras's combination of experiment and mathematics as means of discovery and his use of metaphorical language modelled Newton's comportment. In the opening sentence of the Principia, Newton explicitly identified the reduction of nature to mathematical laws as a 'modern', not an 'ancient', project. 100 In discussions of Pythagoras, Newton seems to have depicted him in the image of a modern investigator, contrasting him with the ancient priests. Briefly looking at these discussions will shed further light on Newton's mathematical presentation.
Pythagoras's reference to the music of the spheres played a central role in Newton's attempts to historicize the inverse-square law. In one such attempt, Pythagoras Abram Kaplan promulgated this image as a vulgarization of his discovery that the planetary distances were measured 'by harmonic proportions of tones and semitones'. 101 In a reworking, Newton adapted from Macrobius's Commentary on the dream of Scipio a story recounting Pythagoras's discovery. Passing by a blacksmith's shop, Pythagoras observed that differently struck hammers generated different tones; directing the blacksmiths to strike different ways, Pythagoras discovered that hammers produced tones in some proportion to their weights. 102 Newton emphasized Pythagoras's experimental procedure: 'it has to be affirmed that larger spheres will give out a deeper sound', Newton wrote, 'but the proportion is not clear from it'. Newton explained that Pythagoras developed an experiment to make sense of the patterns he observed, stretching gut-strings with different weights in order to determine the value of the proportion. The Pythagoreans, Newton claimed, concealed their mathematical results in 'mystical discourses' that they adapted 'to the opinion of the common people', namely, with the notion of the music of the spheres. 103 If the ancients were, as Iliffe claims, 'aware of' the inverse-square law, Pythagoras's-and Newton's-own understanding of this law derived from experimental techniques that were guided by, but distinct from, esoteric transmission. 104 In one of a series of scholia that Newton planned to add to a revised edition of the Principia, he attributed to Pythagoras yet another seventeenth-century technical practice: he made the Greek philosopher a model of the philological use of mathematics on display in those very scholia. 105 The harmonic ratio 'was not sufficiently explained by the ancients', writes Newton, but they 'appear to have concealed this ratio using the harmony of the celestial spheres'. In this version, Pythagoras used experiment to ascertain the ratio and so make sense of the ancients' obscurity: apparently on the basis of the analogy suggested by the image of the music of the spheres, he 'applied the proportion discovered through these experiments to the heavens' and thereby discovered the inverse-square law. 106 Like Pythagoras, Newton used observation and calculus to get beyond analogy. The suitably rebarbative nature of his mathematics, however, meant that he had no need to conceal his discovery in mystical speech.
CONCLUSION
The classical appearance of the Principia is helpfully understood in terms of the seventeenth-century distinction between geometric demonstration and symbolic investigation here instanced by Wallis. For mathematicians, the pernicious persuasiveness of synthesis was more important than the certainty with which it has come to be associated: at stake was psychology, not logical foundation. In line with arguments scholars have made about Newton's alchemy and natural philosophy, Newton brought his historical learning to bear on actual mathematical practice. His innovation was to join the synthesis discourse with the hermeneutic of accommodation then prevalent in studies of ancient learning. Newton disagreed with contemporary mathematicians, not about the variety of techniques one might use for investigation, but about the suitability of investigation as a mode of presentation. Newton's reading in the ancient geometers led him to alight on Euclid's lost porisms as providing a model for a geometrical analysis that would more effectively accommodate the hierarchy of understanding characteristic of mathematics no less than of theology. Wallis believed that sharing his own investigative history would most fruitfully communicate his discoveries to his readers. Newton would Wallis and Newton on mathematical presentation become invested in documenting his actual route to the calculus only later, in the forensic context spawned by his dispute with Leibniz over the invention of calculus. 107 
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